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Abstract Incorporating a prediction into future planning and decision making is
advisable only if we have judged the prediction’s credibility. This is notoriously
difficult and controversial in the case of predictions of future climate. By reviewing
epistemic arguments about climate model performance, we discuss how to make and
justify judgments about the credibility of climate predictions. We propose a new
bounding argument that justifies basing such judgments on the past performance of
possibly dissimilar prediction problems. This encourages a more explicit use of data
in making quantitative judgments about the credibility of future climate predictions,
and in training users of climate predictions to become better judges of credibility.
We illustrate the approach using decadal predictions of annual mean, global mean
surface air temperature.
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1 Introduction
Climate prediction centres produce a large variety and number of climate predictions
and update them fairly frequently for coordinated efforts such as phase 5 of the
Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP5, Taylor et al. 2012). There is
also an increasing demand to incorporate information about future climate into
planning decisions (e.g. HM Government 2012). While there is a strong consensus
concerning recent climate change and the associated influence of human activities,
worrying disagreements persist about the credibility of climate predictions. Many
climate scientists have ‘considerable confidence that climate models provide credible
quantitative estimates of future climate change’ (Randall et al. 2007, p. 600), while
other authors argue that there is little justification for such claims in most cases
(e.g. Parker 2010). In this paper, we encourage attempting to resolve this impasse
by making more explicit use of available data to form quantitative predictions for
the performance of climate predictions and thereby better informing decisions that
depend on future climate.
Before allowing a prediction to influence our behaviour, we should judge the
meaning and relevance of the prediction. We should also judge the credibility of
the prediction, which is the focus of our discussion. In Section 2, we define what we
mean by credibility and discuss how to judge credibility by predicting performance.
In Section 3, we review two arguments for justifying predictions of performance
before outlining a new argument that justifies quantitative bounds on expected
performance. In Section 4, we discuss the role of different data sources in predicting
performance of climate predictions. We illustrate our approach with predictions of
annual mean global mean surface air temperatures in Section 5.
We close this introduction by defining some of our terminology. We consider a
prediction to be a statement about the world. We refer to that which is predicted
as the predictand and the creator of the prediction as the predictor. We distinguish
forecasts and hindcasts: a forecast is a prediction that is issued before the predic-
tand could be determined, while a hindcast is a prediction that is issued after the
predictand could be determined, regardless of whether or not the predictand was
in fact determined before the prediction was issued. Many predictions about future
climate are referred to as projections (e.g. Collins 2007). One reason for this term
is to emphasize that predictions of climate are often conditioned on specific future
boundary conditions—such as the representative concentration pathways used for
some CMIP5 experiments (Moss et al. 2010)—and that these boundary conditions
are not intended as predictions but as plausible future scenarios. More recently,
‘prediction’ has been used to signify near-term (seasonal to decadal) simulations
that are initialized with observations, while ‘projection’ has been used to signify
uninitialized, multi-decadal simulations. The ideas presented below are relevant
to all types of prediction and so we refer generically to ‘predictions’ throughout
Sections 2 and 3, before discussing differences between near- and long-term climate
predictions in Section 4.
2 Judging credibility
There are many factors that might influence our judgment of the credibility of
a prediction. The track record and the theoretical or physical basis of the pre-
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dictor are two common examples. We suggest, however, that such factors should
affect our judgments if and only if they affect our expectations about how well
the prediction will perform. We take this to be self-evident but feel that it helps
to clarify what we must do to judge the credibility of a prediction. In line with
this reasoning, we identify the credibility ascribed to a prediction with a pre-
diction of its performance, and the act of judging credibility becomes the act
of predicting performance. With this definition, credibility is not a binary char-
acteristic, as in statements such as ‘these predictions are credible’; rather, pre-
dictions may be more or less credible depending on how we expect them to
perform.
The performance of a prediction is multi-faceted and our descriptions of per-
formance should always be tailored to the decision problem at hand. In the case
of a deterministic (point) prediction, performance might be described by some
measure of the magnitude of its error. In the case of a probabilistic prediction,
various performance measures are commonly used, such as proper scoring rules
(e.g. Bröcker 2012). We may also wish to describe the performance of a set of
predictions in terms of an aggregated measure such as a correlation coefficient or
reliability statistic (e.g. Ferro and Fricker 2012; Fricker et al. 2013). Some decision
makers may prefer predictions of performance to be expressed qualitatively, as in
‘the error of this climate prediction will probably be small’, while others may prefer
quantitative predictions, as in ‘the error of this climate prediction will be less than 1◦C
with probability 70 %’. However assessments are presented to decision makers, we
believe that they should always be based on quantitative predictions of performance
in order to be able to clarify ambiguous terms such as ‘probable’ and ‘small’, and
thereby justify the guidance given.
One might judge credibility subconsciously, based on experience with the predic-
tor and predictand, but we contend that there are situations in which making explicit,
structured judgments is beneficial. Sometimes, predicting performance is equivalent
to predicting the predictand. For example, a probabilistic prediction for the error of a
deterministic prediction is equivalent to a probabilistic prediction for the predictand.
(Suppose that the predictand is the outcome (heads or tails) of a coin toss, Ros issues
the deterministic prediction ‘heads’, and Guy predicts the performance of Ros’s
prediction by specifying a probability for the event that Ros is correct. Ros is correct
if and only if the coin shows heads, so Guy’s prediction is equivalent to a prediction
for the outcome of the coin toss.) This equivalence does not always hold, however,
in which case predicting the values of a selection of performance measures can help
to synthesize and summarize a large amount of information that is relevant to the
decision problem.
Nevertheless, we could predict performance by forming our own prediction of the
predictand, that is a prediction that reflects our personal beliefs about the predictand.
If p is a prediction for a predictand x and s(p, x) is a measure of performance then
a prediction for x defines a prediction for s(p, x). (For example, a prediction by
Guy for the outcome of the coin toss defines his prediction for Ros being correct.)
Indeed, this is the only possible approach to predicting performance if we have no
information whatsoever about the provenance of the prediction under consideration.
This approach is also appropriate, of course, if predicting performance is equivalent
to predicting the predictand. In all other situations, however, predicting performance
by forming our own prediction of the predictand is inappropriate for the following
reasons.
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First, we contend that allowing our own prediction of the predictand to be
influenced by the prediction under consideration is inappropriate unless we have
already judged its credibility. (If Guy wishes to take into account Ros’s prediction
of heads when he forms his own prediction for the outcome of the coin toss then he
should first judge the credibility of Ros’s prediction.) To avoid this circularity, we
would have to disregard the prediction under consideration when forming our own
prediction of the predictand. A consequence of this, however, is that we may fail
to incorporate relevant information. To see this, suppose that Ros is always correct
when she predicts heads, but is less often correct when she predicts tails. Suppose
also that, before he knows Ros’s prediction, Guy’s prediction for the outcome of the
next coin toss is that heads and tails are equally likely. On its own, Guy’s prediction
would lead him to predict that Ros has an even chance of being correct, whether she
predicts heads or tails. (Guy predicts that heads will occur with probability 50 %, so
that if Ros predicts heads then Guy predicts that she will be correct with probability
50 %, and similarly for tails.) This is unreasonable because Guy knows that Ros
will be correct if she predicts heads. In most situations, therefore, we should seek
to predict performance directly rather than solely via our own prediction of the
predictand.
If the prediction under consideration, p, is our own prediction of the predictand,
x, then we can and should still predict its performance. If p is deterministic then
predicting its performance could amount to making our prediction probabilistic. If
p is already probabilistic, however, then our prediction of its performance is already
determined by p: our prediction for the performance measure s(p, x) is defined by
our prediction, p, of x. This is also the reason why predicting performance does not
lead to a regress: we do not need to predict the performance of our prediction of
the performance of p because this latter can already account for all of our relevant
uncertainties.
3 Justifying predictions of performance
3.1 Construction-based arguments
We argued in the previous section that in order to judge the credibility of a prediction
we should predict its performance. As with any non-trivial prediction, we should not
expect our predictions of performance to be perfect, but we should aim to minimize
errors. To this end, we scrutinize now the arguments that we might employ to justify
predictions of performance.
One way to justify a prediction of performance might be to argue that perfor-
mance can be deduced logically from facts or assumptions about the predictor and
predictand without reference to the past performance of the predictor. This is called
a design- or construction-based argument by Parker (2010, 2011).
Construction-based arguments are valid in some circumstances. If the perfor-
mance measure is independent of the predictand then performance can be deduced
from the prediction alone. Examples include criteria that check the prediction
for self-contradictions (e.g. daily minimum temperatures exceeding daily maximum
temperatures), or that assess the confidence (e.g. sharpness) of the prediction.
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If the performance measure does depend on the predictand then additional
information must be used in order to justify a prediction of performance. One
such construction-based argument that has been discussed in the context of climate
predictions concerns the ‘perfect model scenario’ (Smith 2002, 2006). The argument
here is that an ensemble of predictions will be reliable if the ensemble-generating
model is structurally similar to the predicted system in all relevant aspects and if
its inputs are sampled to represent the uncertainty (e.g. the known distribution of
measurement error) in the initial conditions of the predicted system. See also Betz
(2006, ch. 9) and Stainforth et al. (2007). Which aspects of the predicted system are
relevant depends on the prediction problem, so a model may be adequate for one
type of prediction but not for others. Some authors, however, consider the structure
of today’s climate models to be insufficiently similar to that of the climate system for
such an argument to provide a strong justification of reliability for most prediction
problems (e.g. Betz 2006; Frame et al. 2007; Parker 2010). Smith (2006) doubts that
weather and climate models sufficiently isomorphic to the climate system will ever be
realized. See Parker (2010), Allen et al. (2006) and Otto (2012) for similarly negative
conclusions regarding arguments based on ‘imperfect model scenarios’.
Unless rather trivial measures of performance are of interest, it seems that
construction-based arguments are unable to justify predictions for the performance
of most climate model predictions because climate models are imperfect and it is
difficult to trace the effects of imperfections through complex systems. This applies
equally to predictions of good and bad performance—construction-based arguments
do not provide strong justification for predictions of poor performance—and so we
must look to other arguments.
3.2 Performance-based arguments
Another way to justify a prediction of performance might be to argue that perfor-
mance can be extrapolated from information about the past performance of the
predictor. This is called a performance-based argument by Parker (2010).
Performance-based arguments proceed by identifying a class of predictions that
contains the prediction, p, whose performance is under consideration, such that
one has no reason to believe in advance that any particular prediction in the class
will perform better than any other prediction in the class. The performances of a
sample of predictions in the class are then measured and the performance of p is
subsequently inferred following standard statistical procedures.
The key stage in performance-based arguments is to justify the choice of reference
class. Membership of the class should be determined by characteristics of the predic-
tion problems, derived from knowledge about both the predictor and the predictand.
For example, if future conditions are expected to differ from past conditions only in
ways that are unlikely to affect the performance of predictions then past predictions
and future predictions may be judged to belong to the same class.
Performance-based arguments are familiar in weather forecasting, where past
performance is often taken to be a face-value indicator of future performance. Parker
(2010) contends that such arguments fail to justify predictions for the performance
of climate predictions, however, because past cases whose performances can be mea-
sured differ significantly from predictions into the future. In particular, the relevance
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of hindcasts is compromised by the possibility that climate models have been tuned to
perform well in the hindcast period, and the future forcings (such as concentrations
of greenhouse gases) prescribed in climate predictions differ significantly from the
forcings prescribed in the hindcasts. The studies by Reifen and Toumi (2009) and
Weigel et al. (2010) attest to changes in performance over time. See also Frame et al.
(2007).
While performance-based arguments may not provide strong justifications for
predictions of the performance of climate predictions, there does seem to be scope
for them to provide some justification. Even a small number of past predictions
similar to the future predictions under consideration can help to give a rough
indication of likely performance, and this may be very informative if the indication
differs markedly from any prior expectations of performance.
3.3 Bounding arguments
In this subsection we propose a third type of argument for justifying quantitative
predictions of the performance of climate predictions. While there may be few
similar prediction problems from which we can infer the performance of climate
predictions via the performance-based arguments of the previous subsection, there
are many other climate-model experiments providing data that are commonly used to
justify judgments about credibility. We might judge that some of these experiments
are sufficiently similar to one another to form a reference class, and the statistical
properties of the performance of members of the class can then be inferred from a
sample of cases, as before. Even if the prediction whose performance is in question
is not judged to be a member of this class, we might be willing to judge that it is
either a harder or easier prediction problem than those in the reference class. In
other words, we expect the performance of the prediction in question to be either
worse or better than the performance of randomly selected members of the reference
class. In this case, the inferred performance for the members of the reference
class provides an upper or lower bound on the performance of the prediction in
question.
To be precise, let S denote the performance of a randomly selected prediction
from a reference class C and suppose that the value of S must lie on the positive
real line with smaller values indicating better performance. Suppose also that we
have used a sample of cases from C to estimate the probability distribution of perfor-
mances in C. Let this distribution be denoted by the cumulative distribution function
F(s) = Pr(S ≤ s) for all s > 0. Now let S′ denote the performance of a randomly
selected prediction from a class C′ that contains the prediction under consideration,
and let F ′(s) = Pr(S′ ≤ s) denote the unknown distribution of performances in C′. If
we judge that the prediction problems in C′ are harder than the prediction problems
in C then we obtain the bound F ′(s) < F(s) for all s > 0, i.e. the chance of the
prediction in question achieving a performance as good as s is at most F(s). Similarly,
if we judge that the prediction problems in C′ are easier than the prediction problems
in C then we obtain the bound F ′(s) > F(s) for all s > 0, i.e. the chance of the
prediction in question achieving a performance as good as s is at least F(s). We shall
give numerical examples of such bounds in Section 5. Simultaneous upper and lower
bounds may be obtained if both a harder reference class and an easier reference class
can be identified.
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The key stage in the performance-based argument in the previous subsection is
to justify the choice of reference class. Such a justification is also needed here to
define the bounding reference class, but now the class need not include the prediction
under consideration, and so there is more scope to identify such classes. On the other
hand, the bounding argument proposed here also requires us to justify a judgment
that the prediction problem of interest is either harder or easier than the prediction
problems in the bounding reference class. This is a similar type of judgment to that
used to define reference classes as it should be based on similar information, namely
characteristics of the prediction problems. However, the judgment that a prediction
problem is harder or easier than other problems is a stronger judgment than that
required to define a reference class because the direction of departure from the
reference class must be specified. Furthermore, some of the characteristics of the
prediction problem under consideration may suggest that the problem is easier than
those in the reference class, while other characteristics may suggest that the problem
is harder. A further complication is the possibility that some levels of performance
may be judged to be harder to achieve for the prediction in question than for the
predictions in the reference class, while other levels of performance may be judged
to be easier to achieve. In such circumstances, the ordering of the probabilities F(s)
and F ′(s) would be judged to vary with s. Justifying such detailed judgments is likely
to be difficult, at least for climate predictions. There is no straightforward solution
to these complications but we reiterate that we should not expect perfect predictions
of performance; we merely seek to improve current predictions, and believe that the
simple harder/easier judgment proposed above has the potential to meet this goal in
the case of climate predictions at least.
4 Empirical evidence
In this section, we discuss some of the data that may be used to define bounding
reference classes, and how different classes might relate to climate prediction prob-
lems in terms of their difficulty. Predictors such as climate models that are used to
forecast the future climate are also used to produce a variety of other predictions. For
example, climate models are used to generate out-of-sample forecasts and in-sample
hindcasts, both of the real world and, in perfect and imperfect model experiments, of
other simulations. These predictions are made for assorted predictands, at a range of
lead times, and under an array of initial and boundary conditions. The performance
of such predictions is commonly cited as evidence for the expected performance of
climate forecasts (e.g. Randall et al. 2007). If we can group these predictions into
reference classes and judge how they relate to the climate prediction problems of
interest then they can inform our expectations about climate forecasts and help us to
make more quantitative predictions for their performance.
The more similar a reference class is to the prediction of interest, the easier
it is likely to be to justify the relationship between the two, and the tighter the
bound on performance is likely to be. Such reference classes can act as strong
guides for our expectations. Indeed, the performance-based argument of Section 3.2
may be viewed as a limiting case of our bounding argument as the reference class
becomes more and more similar to the prediction of interest. This reasoning suggests
forming reference classes of predictions with the same predictand as the prediction
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of interest. For example, if we wish to bound the performance of predictions of
global mean, annual mean surface air temperature, then we might do well to form
reference classes from other experiments in which this quantity is simulated. For the
same reason, bounding arguments are likely to be more effective if the reference
classes comprise predictions issued by the predictor whose predictions are under
consideration, rather than predictions issued by another predictor. Predictions from
other predictors might be useful, nevertheless, particularly if the predictors form a
hierarchy with the predictor in question. For example, it may be possible to argue
that a higher resolution version of a climate model is expected to perform better than
a lower resolution version of the same model. This reasoning also suggests that we
should design hindcast experiments to be as similar as possible to climate forecasts
by mirroring the extent of tuning possible for out-of-sample forecasts. This might
include running perturbed-physics ensembles to detune climate models, and cross-
validating performance measures in case model output is bias corrected or otherwise
post-processed.
Although more similar reference classes will tend to yield tighter bounds, we
should also collect data on as wide a range of prediction problems as possible.
Very dissimilar reference classes may have little impact on our expectations for
performance, but the information that they provide can do no harm. More data can
only sharpen our bounds, and if we encounter a reference class whose performance
is unexpectedly good or bad then this may radically alter our expectations about
the performance of the prediction of interest. Ideally, therefore, we should conduct
experiments with predictors such as climate models that explore the full range of
physical processes that may influence forecasts of future climate, and a wide range
of initial conditions and boundary conditions. The range of conditions that can
be explored is limited when predictions of the real world are made, but perfect
and imperfect model experiments have a useful role in a fuller testing of climate
models.
Reference classes may provide either upper or lower bounds on our expectations
for performance. Reference classes of prediction problems that are harder than
climate predictions of interest might be formed from hypothetical, worst-case pre-
dictions (e.g. predictions of unphysical values) or possibly from climate models that
are known to be fundamentally inadequate. It may be difficult, though, to identify
harder reference classes that provide very tight bounds on our expectations. Even if
reference classes of only easier prediction problems are available, however, this can
still help to prevent over-confidence (Frame et al. 2007).
One example of an easier reference class might be predictions in a perfect model
experiment, if we expect a climate model to perform better when predicting its
own simulations than when predicting the real world. Whether imperfect model
experiments, on the other hand, produce predictions that are harder or easier than
predictions of the real world is less clear. Climate models are structurally more
similar to one another than they are to the real climate system (Smith 2002), but new
studies (e.g. Knutti et al. 2013) indicate that simulations produced by the current
generation of climate models can be less similar to one another than they are to
observations of the real world. The genealogy of climate models (Masson and Knutti
2011) may provide useful information when deciding if imperfect model predictions
yield harder or easier reference classes.
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Out-of-sample predictions might be considered harder than in-sample predictions,
with the relative difficulty being related to the extent to which the predictor is
tuned to the in-sample prediction problems and how far out of sample the out-
of-sample predictions are. This point is germane to long-term climate predictions:
we might expect a climate model to perform worse when it is forced by boundary
conditions that differ significantly from those conditions under which the model has
been tested and developed. However, this judgment should also account for the
possibility that the model may be known to respond accurately to certain changes
in forcing, or may be forced into a state where it tends to perform well. Predictions
with long lead times will often be considered harder than predictions with short lead
times, although some account must be taken of the physical processes involved and
how well these processes are represented by the predictor. In some applications,
it may also be known that some initial states correlate with better predictive
performance. These are the sort of considerations that help to define bounding
relationships between reference classes and thereby help to bound expectations of
performance.
Another feature of climate predictions that is often used to justify their credibility
is agreement among different predictors (e.g. Knutti 2008). Smith (2006) and Parker
(2011) argue that this justification is weak, for the same reasons that construction-
and performance-based arguments are weak. The value of model agreement could
be investigated empirically by forming reference classes of predictions for which
there exist different levels of agreement. If agreement is indicative of performance
then these reference classes can be used to bound the expected performance of other
predictions.
The data discussed above are already used to judge the credibility of climate
predictions. We have merely argued for a more explicit use of the data to obtain
quantitative bounds on expected performance. This approach forces us to interrogate
our assumptions and can help to identify gaps in our understanding. Bounding
arguments still rely significantly on subjective judgment to form reference classes
and to specify their performance relationships, and so they are still susceptible to
errors of judgment. Importantly, however, we can train ourselves to become better
judges of these matters using existing climate experiments. For example, we can
define two reference classes of prediction problems, say one from a perfect model
experiment and one from an imperfect model experiment, and decide which class
we think comprises the harder prediction problems. Then we can measure the
performance of predictions in the two classes and check if our judgment was accurate.
We illustrate this in the next section using decadal predictions of global mean annual
mean temperature as an example. The extent to which such training helps us to
improve our judgments about the performance of specific prediction problems may
depend on whether the factors that cause us to make errors of judgment are similar
in both the training and target problems. Once again, therefore, the more similar
the training problems are to the predictions of interest, the more useful they may be
for improving our judgments. In the specific case of long-term climate predictions,
for which we may feel that we have no similar training problems, examples of
shorter term predictions or of imperfect model predictions in which the effects of
unresolved processes are critical may help us to develop a better intuition for the
impacts on performance of such model limitations. More generally, a wide range
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of training problems may help to correct any general disposition towards over- or
under-confidence in performance.
5 Illustrative numerical examples
We illustrate the bounding arguments outlined above with decadal climate predic-
tions from the Met Office general circulation model HadCM3 (Gordon et al. 2000)
that form part of CMIP5. An ensemble of ten hindcasts, formed by perturbing the
initial conditions, is launched every year during the hindcast period, 1960 to 2000. We
analyze annual mean, global mean surface air temperature anomalies and measure
the performance of ensemble members with their absolute errors. We also use an
ensemble member from the Météo France model CNRM-CM5 (Voldoire et al.
2013) and the observed temperature record HadCRUT3 (Brohan et al. 2006) as
verifications in some of our examples. Anomalies for each time series are calculated
with respect to its own mean temperature, which is estimated from the temperature
values for the first year of each hindcast launch, from 1960 to 1990. Figure 1a displays
a subset of the hindcasts.
Fig. 1 a Annual mean, global mean surface air temperature anomalies: HadCRUT3 (solid black),
CNRM-CM5 (dashed black) and HadCM3 members 1, 2 and 3 (grey) launched every five years; b
c.d.f.s of the absolute errors for HadCM3 members 2 (dashed) and 3 (solid) at lead times of one year
(black) and ten years (grey) when HadCM3 member 1 is the verification; c as b but CNRM-CM5 is
the verification; d as b but HadCRUT3 is the verification
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We begin with an illustration of a performance-based argument rather than a
bounding argument. We consider a perfect model experiment in which we investigate
how well HadCM3 ensemble members predict other members of the same ensemble.
We take member 1 to be the verification, consider a lead time of one year, and define
a reference class of predictions to comprise the 369 predictions that span the 41-year
hindcast period from the nine other members. Now we measure the 41 absolute
errors for member 2, whose cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) is plotted in
Fig. 1b (dashed black line). The c.d.f. depicts the proportion of errors that are no
larger than the value on the horizontal axis. For example, about 90 % of the errors
are less than 0.1 K for member 2 in Fig. 1b (dashed black line). If we were interested
now in the performance of member 3 then we could use the c.d.f. for member 2 as a
prediction for the performance of member 3 because we have judged that members
2 and 3 belong to the same reference class. In this example, moreover, we can check
if this judgment is accurate by calculating the c.d.f. of the 41 errors for member 3
and comparing it to the c.d.f. for member 2. The c.d.f. for member 3 is also shown in
Fig. 1b (solid black line) and is indeed similar to the c.d.f. for member 2, thus showing
that our prediction of performance of these one-year ahead climate predictions is
accurate.
Now we illustrate a bounding argument. Suppose that we are interested in the
performance of member 3 at a lead time of ten years. How is our prediction of its
performance guided by the c.d.f. of absolute errors for member 2 at a lead time of
one year? Our expectation might be that forecasting ten years ahead is a harder
prediction problem than forecasting one year ahead. (It is possible, for some states
and forcing of the climate system, that we might expect the opposite, but in most
cases we expect ensemble members to diverge and errors to grow with lead time.) In
this case, we would take the c.d.f. for member 2 at one year in Fig. 1b to be an upper
bound on the c.d.f. corresponding to our prediction of the errors of member 3 at ten
years. Figure 1b shows that this expectation would be correct: the errors at ten years
(grey lines) tend to be greater than the errors at one year (black lines). The bound
has provided a useful guideline for our expectations.
Our next example of a bounding argument considers an imperfect model ex-
periment in which we use the CNRM-CM5 ensemble member as the verification.
We might expect the performance of HadCM3 member 3 at a given lead time
to be worse in the imperfect model scenario than in the perfect model scenario,
assuming that model formulation is the dominant difference between the simulations.
Comparing the solid lines in Fig. 1c with the corresponding solid lines in Fig. 1b shows
that, for either lead time, the errors do indeed tend to be larger in the imperfect
model scenario, and so our approach has again provided a correct bound for our
expectations of performance.
Our final example of a bounding argument uses the HadCRUT3 observations
for the verification and corresponds to bounding the expected performance in the
real world, rather than in a perfect or imperfect model example. For each lead
time, we might expect HadCM3 to perform worse in this situation than in both the
perfect and imperfect model scenarios. Comparing the lines in Fig. 1b–d shows that
this expectation is wrong for both lead times: the errors tend to be smaller when
hindcasting reality compared to the imperfect model scenario but slightly larger than
in the perfect model scenario. This is in line with the findings of Knutti et al. (2013)
mentioned in Section 4. Even if we had formed such mistaken expectations in this
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case, the bound would nonetheless have prevented us from being overconfident: we
would have assumed that things would be worse than they actually are and thus
applied a cautionary approach (Frame et al. 2007). Moreover, this new evidence
might cause us to revise future judgments, particularly if we can determine why our
original expectation was misguided.
From these examples, we can see the potential difficulties of correctly predicting
performance, even if we aim only to bound our expectations. For example, we found
that performance was worse in the imperfect model scenario than when hindcasting
reality. If we wanted to predict the performance of future predictions of annual mean,
global mean surface air temperatures from HadCM3, this experience might make us
wary of using the results of imperfect model experiments to bound our expectations.
On the other hand, we might be willing to adopt the c.d.f.s from the perfect model
scenario as upper bounds on our expectations for the performance at the two lead
times.
6 Discussion
We have noted the importance of being able to justify quantitative predictions
for the performance of predictions. We have also agreed with other authors that
construction- and performance-based arguments provide little justification in the
case of future climate predictions. Instead, we have proposed bounding argu-
ments as one possible way of using data more explicitly to justify quantitative
predictions for the performance of future climate predictions. Our examples have
shown the difficulty of predicting performance correctly, and that the confidence
with which we make bounding arguments may depend on various features of
the prediction problem, such as the predictand, predictor, post-processing method,
and performance measure. We have recommended using existing experiments to
train ourselves to be better judges of performance. Whenever our expectations
are overthrown, we should try to understand the causes of our misjudgment. Not
only will this lead us to make better judgments in the future, but this can also
prompt us to investigate ways in which our climate prediction systems might be
improved.
While we hope that bounding arguments demonstrate the potential to use data
more effectively, the bounding approach that we have presented is, nonetheless,
rather simple-minded. We envisage developing these ideas to make fully probabilistic
judgments about performance, possibly along the following lines. If S denotes the
performance of a prediction in a class C then we might select a probability model
F(s | θ) to represent its distribution, where θ is a model parameter. We might also
describe our uncertainty about the performance, S′, of the prediction of interest
with the distribution F(s | φθ), where φ is a second parameter that characterizes the
difference between the distributions of the performances of S and S′. If we represent
our prior beliefs about θ and φ with probability density functions g and h, and if we
measure the performances, D = (s1, . . . , sn), from a sample of n cases from C, then
the predictive distribution for S′ can be expressed as
Pr(S′ ≤ s | D) =
∫
F(s | φθ)g(θ | D)h(φ) dθ dφ.
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A key part of such an approach is the specification of our beliefs about φ. Bounding
arguments may help us to formulate these beliefs and thus render explicit our implicit
assumptions about a prediction’s credibility.
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